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Insofar as we suppose that judicial decisions are attributable to
the prior social experiences and attitudes of judges, we are tempted
to predict the outcome when a judge is called upon to pass on his
own work as scholar and legislator. The reforms for which he has
fought will tend to dominate his viewpoint to the exclusion of com-
peting considerations. If their validity is challenged under the Con-
stitution or other governing law, he will defend them zealously. Should
another court, even a higher one, construe them in ways he dislikes,
he will do his best to avoid the precedents. If the statutory language
of the reforms or the understandings on which they were enacted
are themselves at variance with his preferences in certain particulars,
he will seek to cure the discrepancies through judicial interpretation.'
Copyright 1976 by Michael E. Smith. I am grateful to the William Nelson Cromwell
Foundation, which is generously supporting my research on the history of the Second
Circuit; to Professor Elias Clark and the Yale Law School, for allowing me to examine
Judge Clark's private papers and for facilitating their use; and to Professors Charles
Alan Wright of the University of Texas and Jan Vetter of the University of California
at Berkeley, whose advice has saved me from the worst of my mistakes. Professor Wright,
coauthor of a definitihe treatise on the Federal Rules, 4-12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1969-1973), was Clark's law clerk and later his chief
adviser on the 1955 proposed amendments to the Rules.
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1. Professor Kadish suggests that Felix Frankfurter, perhaps the best known scholar-
legislator-judge, bore out these predictions. In the late 1920's, Professor Frankfurter co-
authored a classic study, F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930),
which detailed the abuses of the injunction, both procedural and substantive, and recom-
mended that it be abolished as a weapon against unionization. At the same time, he
helped draft the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110,
113-115 (1970)), finally adopted in 1932, which carried out the book's legislative proposals.
In the course of drafting the law, Frankfurter and his colleague, Senator George Norris,
were urged to ban not only injunctions but all other legal proceedings in the federal
courts against the specified labor activities. Although sympathetic to the plea, they ul-
timately rejected it, mainly for fear that enlargement would expose the bill to consti-
tutional assault. By the time Frankfurter was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1939,
that tribunal had dispelled the constitutional doubts. Thus, when he was confronted in
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), with a criminal prosecution against
labor union officers under the Sherman Act, Kadish suggests that he found irresistible
the temptation to hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act had indirectly precluded legal
reprisals of any kind against the activities covered by the statute. See Kadish, Labor and
the Law, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 164 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964). Kadish
concludes: "Maintaining the equipoise between adjudication and legislation, difficult
as it is, proved impossible here, where the judge had also, in effect, been the legislator."
Id. at 173.
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Probably the fullest and most complex example of the scholar and
legislator turned judge is Charles E. Clark. After nearly 15 years at
the Yale Law School spent teaching and writing on civil procedure,
Clark was appointed Reporter to the Supreme Court's Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules for Civil Procedure. In that role he was principally
responsible for the drafting of the Federal Rules, which became law
in 1938. When the Committee was revived in 1942 to oversee the
functioning of the Rules, Clark was reappointed its Reporter and
held this job until 1956, when the Committee was discharged. During
this period he was again largely responsible for the Committee's work,
which included guiding a set of amendments to adoption in 1946 and
proposing an even more far-reaching revision in 1955. In 1960 the
Committee was reconstituted as part of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, and Clark was again made a member. In the next
three years until his death, many of the amendments he had urged
in 1955 were finally adopted into law.
Meanwhile, in 1939 Clark had become a judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. From that year until 1963,
Clark heard hundreds of cases that required interpretation or appli-
cation of the Federal Rules. In well over 100, he wrote signed opinions,
dealing at length with more than 30 different Rules.
Previous research has emphasized the impact of Clark's scholarly
and legislative experiences on his conduct as a judge. According to
Marvin Schick, author of Learned Hand's Court, Clark's prior ac-
tivities "significantly influenced his performance on the bench and
limited his ability to creatively confront litigation which presented
procedural questions."2 His work as a judge was characterized by
"fierce, unrelenting promotion of fidelity to certain ideas that he had
regarding procedure" and by a "passion and fervent devotion to the
rules and the work of the Advisory Committee. ' 3 As a consequence,
"for the most part, Judge Clark rigorously defended procedural rules
irrespective of results."'4
The purpose of this article is to probe more intensively and com-
pletely the proposition that in cases involving the Federal Rules
Clark's behavior was strongly influenced by his experience as scholar
and draftsman of the Rules. My examination of these cases confirms
this proposition, with two especially significant qualifications. First,
the extent to which Clark stood rigidly by his prior procedural views
can be explained in part by his particular personality. Second, on
2. M. SCHICK, LEARNED HANDS COURT 31 (1970).
3. id. at 32, 241.
4. Id. at 225.
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a number of subjects Clark had to make hard choices, unaided by
his prior views, with results that could not easily have been predicted.
In Part I of the article, I discuss the main views Clark brought
with him to the bench concerning the Rules. A series of succeeding
sections deals with his judicial work on each of these subjects. For
efficiency, I have confined myself largely to litigated cases in which
Clark wrote signed opinions dealing expressly with the Rules.; The
article ends with an attempt to assess the data in terms of the prob-
lem posed above.
I. Clark's Prior Views
Discussion of the views Judge Clark brought with him to the bench
may aptly begin with a lecture entitled Procedure: the Handmaid
of Justice,6 published shortly before he became a judge, in which he
summed up his beliefs on the subject. Clark implicitly urged two
of the cardinal virtues of this concept of procedure: cases would be
decided on their merits rather than by procedural rulings, and this
would occur with an economy of time and resources. He never analyzed
systematically the potential clash of these values in particular cases,
but was much more interested in working out their implications for
lawmaking. These he deemed to be merger of law and equity in "a
single civil action," "general as distinguished from special pleading,"
and "freedom to join diverse claims and various parties.' '7 Virtually
all Clark's procedural reforms derive from these specific policies or
their underlying values.
The first plank of Clark's reform platform was the merger of law
and equity prescribed in Rule 2.8 The only major procedural dis-
5. This excludes not only Clark's per curiam opinions, opinions wsritten by others
with his advice, and opinions in which issues involving the Federal Rules were passed
over in silence, but also his activities as a judicial administrator. Within these bounds, I
have aimed for relatively thorough treatment in part to provide raw material for readers
with related but broader interests.
I have relied mainly on traditional materials: Clark's judicial opinions, published
writings, and recorded speeches and the legal analyses of other scholars. But I have also
had access to Clark's private correspondence, the recollections of personal acquaintances,
and the memoranda exchanged among the judges of the Second Circuit on each of the
cases discussed herein. The last are a particularly informative source, but also a highly
sensitive one by traditional standards of the profession. I have declined to quote the
memoranda for what seemed only to be purposes of entertainment; I have not spared
them when I felt they might illuminate the subject.
6. Clark, Procedure: The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WAsH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938) [herein-
after cited as Clark, Handmaid].
7. Id. at 308.
8. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended many times since their
passage in 1938. Unless otherwise noted, when the Rule discussed in the text may be
understood by reference to the present Rules, citation is to the present form. When
confusion would result, citation is to the earlier form of the Rule.
Vol. 85: 914, 1976
Judge Clark and the Federal Rules
tinction which Clark felt ought to survive merger concerned the
right to jury trial. On this point his main objective was to prevent
losing parties from manipulating the troublesome boundary between
law and equity to obtain reconsideration. 9 Accordingly, Rule 38 pro-
vided for a waiver of jury trial if it was not claimed explicitly at
the start of the proceeding. Indeed, Clark would have gone further
to ensure against appellate reversal, allowing the judge to order jury
trial in all cases regardless of the parties' rights.10 This scheme, in-
cluded in a preliminary draft of the Rules," was one of several pro-
visions eventually rejected by the Advisory Committee after consul-
tation with lawyers, scholars, and judges. As for the right to a jury
trial, Clark contended that it ought to depend on the status of the
action at the time the Constitution was written, and that it should
be determined as to each claim presented rather than by character-
izing the action as a whole. 12 He did not notice the potential conflict
between these two approaches when the historical rule was to treat
the entire action as equitable notwithstanding the presence of legal
claims.l ,
The second feature of Clark's reform platform was "general as
distinguished from special pleading." He believed that a great variety
of pleading techniques should be permitted.' 4 He definitely preferred,
however, that the pleading present facts alone, rather than legal the-
ories as well, and that the facts be stated in a brief, general fashion.'-
In this respect Clark was again prepared to go further than the Ad-
visory Committee,", but his views were adequately provided for in
Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b).'7
At the same time, Clark insisted that there were limits to the
generality of pleading allowed under the Federal Rules. A bare al-
legation that the defendant had injured the plaintiff through negli-
9. Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure II, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1297-98 (1935).
10. PROCEEDIN.S OF -iur ABA INSTITUTE ON TlE FEDE AL RULES oF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
CLLVLLAND, Otno 228 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGSI.
11. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ADVISORY COMMI'IEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND TlE SUI'REME COURT OF THlE DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA 83 (1936)
[hereinafter cited as 1936 PRELIMINARY DRA-T].
12. Clark & Moore, supra note 9, at 1296.
13. See 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 274-76.
14. See id. at 228.
15. Clark, Handmaid, supra note 6, at 316.
16. 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 220.
17. Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain a short and plain statement of the
basis for the court's jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim, and a demand
for judgment. Rule 10(b) requires separate statements only for claims based upon
separate transactions or occurrences and only when separation would facilitate clarity
of presentation.
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gence, he said, would not suffice.'8 But if such an error in pleading
were made, Clark sought to minimize its procedural consequences.
He supported liberal amendment of defective pleadings, as provided
in Rule 15, and also endorsed Rule 54(c), which made amendment
of defective demands for relief unnecessary.' 9
Intimately related to pleading, in Clark's view, was pretrial prac-
tice, by which facts were exposed, issues narrowed, and some cases
disposed of without trial. Clark opposed the traditional methods of
achieving these objectives, deeming them both harsh and inefficient.2-'
He succeeded in abolishing demurrers by Rule 7(c), in partially con-
solidating dilatory pleas2 ' in Rule 12, and in obtaining discretion
for the judge to postpone hearing them until trial. He would also
have abolished the bill of particulars,2 2 obliged the dilatory pleas to
be asserted with the answer on the merits, and, except under unusual
circumstances, required them to be heard at trial..2 3 The preliminary
draft largely achieved his aims, 24 but after receiving the reactions of
bench and bar, the Advisory Committee permitted the traditional
procedures to survive.
As better means of achieving his pretrial objectives, Clark sup-
ported the pretrial conferences of Rule 16, the depositions and dis-
covery provided for by Rules 26-37, and the motions for summary
judgment of Rule 56.25 Except for the last, Clark knew little about
these provisions; another scholar, Professor Edson Sutherland, had
drafted them. But Clark saw them as important complements to his
campaign for simplified pleading and against traditional pretrial prac-
tices. As for summary judgment, Clark would have made it a more
useful means of testing the merits of a case prior to trial by requiring
18. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABA SYMP'osIui ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
NEW YORK 241 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS].
19. Clark 8 Moore, supra note 9, at 1300, 1303. Rule 54(c) provides: "Except as to
a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
20. Clark & Moore, supra note 9, at 1308. He felt that traditional pretrial methods
such as demurrers and dilatory pleas, see note 21 infra, postponed actual decisions on
the merits and unduly penalized parties who made formal errors. Clark & Moore, supra
note 9, at 1299-1306.
21. Dilatory pleas are a class of defenses not related to the merits of the case. At
common law, they consisted of pleas to the personal or subject matter jurisdiction of
the court and pleas in abatement alleging incapacity to sue, misjoinder of parties, im-
proper service of process, and similar procedural defects. C. CLARK, CODE PLADING
500-01 (2d ed. 1947).
22. Clark & Moore, supra note 9, at 1310.
23. 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 239.
24. 1936 PRELIMINARY DIrT, supra note 11, at 29-30.
25. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules, 15 TrNN. L.
REv. 551, 567, 580 (1939).
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the answering party to respond with factual allegations as specific
as those supporting the motion.26 The preliminary draft came closer
to achieving this objective than the final version of the Rules.2 7
The third aspect of Clark's procedural platform was "freedom to
join diverse claims and various parties," enabling entire disputes to
be resolved in one proceeding. With his strong support,28 Rule 13
and numerous succeeding provisions permitted the parties to opt
for exceedingly wide joinder. Clark hoped to avoid possible constitu-
tional or statutory limitations by means of ancillary jurisdiction over
all parts of the suit arising out of the same facts.2 9 Indeed, as in
Rule 13(a), he approved of compelling the parties to join all claims
connected factually with the original action.30
Clark also endorsed simplified selection of proper parties. Although
Rule 17(a), over his objections,31 retained the traditionally complex
concept of "the real party in interest," Clark insisted that the Ad-
visory Committee understood this to mean merely the person to whom
substantive law had already given the right to sue.32 And in the event
of an error, or a change in circumstances, Clark favored the free sub-
stitution of parties provided by Rules 21 and 25.33
There were limits to Clark's endorsement of joinder, however. He
suggested that judgments in so-called "spurious" class actions ought
to bind only actual participants, 3 4 although this restriction was not
spelled out in Rule 23(a)(3). 35 He also felt that Rule 14 went too far
in allowing a defendant to implead a party liable solely to the plain-
tiff,36 apparently believing that the plaintiff would be forced to in-
clude the impleaded party in his suit. This provision, omitted from
the preliminary draft, was added later at the behest of the admiralty
bar.3 7
26. Clark, The Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 447, 450 (1936) [here-
inafter cited as Clark, Proposed Rules].
27. 1936 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 11, at 76-77. The 1963 amendment to Rule
56(e) on summary judgrient requires this specific response from the party opposing sum-
mary judgment. 6-2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE J 56.22[2], at 56-1335-46 (2d ed. 1975).
28. 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 262.
29. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABA INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
WASHINGTON. D.C. 62 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS].
30. Clark & Moore, supra note 9, at 1306.
31. Clark, Proposed Rules, supra note 26, at 491.
32. 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 257.
33. Clark & Moore, supra note 9, at 1317-18.
34. 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 264-65.
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(3) (1938). The modern Rule 23 differs significantly from
the original version. For a discussion of the differences between original and amended
Rule 23, see note 167 infra.
36. See FED. R. Ci'. P. 14 (1938). The Current Rule 14 allows this only in admiralty
c .,ses.
37. 1938 WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 29, at 61-62.
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Merger of law and equity, simplified pleading, and wide joinder
of causes and parties were the main provisions of the original Federal
Rules on which Clark later passed as a judge and on which he ex-
pressed strong personal views prior to his appointment3s The Rules
covered other matters that he had never pondered as a scholar, the
framing of which he had left primarily to his colleagues, including
Professor J.W. Moore, and on which he lacked strong personal opin-
ions. Many concerned technical details which never arose in subse-
quent litigation, but on others Clark later ruled as a judge. The most
controversial was Rule 54(b), which concerned piecemeal appeals. The
preliminary draft had allowed such an appeal whenever any "issue"
had been finally determined by a trial judge; 30 the enacted version
cut this down greatly, in effect barring appeal until an entire "claim"
had been finally adjudicated.
Thus, the heritage Clark brought with him to the bench from his
years as scholar and lawmaker was more complex than we might have
supposed. On many subjects he had well-developed scholarly views
which he succeeded in writing into law. Here, his course as a judge
was presumably clearly marked. But on other subjects on which he
had strong views, he was outvoted by his colleagues on the Advisory
Committee. There, he would have to choose whether to follow his
own beliefs or the Rules. On yet other issues, Clark had no distinct
views or only mild preferences. For these, he would be obliged to
work out his perspective as cases arose after he became a judge.
Apart from his disappointment ir the failure to enact several of
his proposals, Clark felt that the Federal Rules constituted a thoroughly
sound reform. He therefore endorsed their widest possible use. Al-
though he never publicly attacked Rule 81(a)(1), which made the
Rules inapplicable to admiralty cases, there is much reason to believe
that he regretted this exclusion. 40 And following the decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins,41 which came down during the final stage of
38. For Clark's views on the admissibility of evidence (Rule 43(a)), see Clark, Pro-
posed Rules, supra note 26, at 450; Clark, Foreword: A Symposium on the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 10 Rutr. L. REV. 479, 481-83 (1956). For his views on review of district
court findings under Rule 52(a), see Clark, Proposed Rules, supra note 26, at 451; Clark,
Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 JuD. 129 (1936); Clark & Stone, Re-
view of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 190 (1937).
39. 1936 PRELIMINARY DRrr, supra note 11, at 109.
40. Letters to Alexander Holtzoff (pt. 27, 1939) and Roscoe Hupper (Dec. 17, 1941).
Unless otherwise noted, all letters are written by or to Charles Clark. All letters are
in the Charles Clark Papers, Yale Law Library.
41. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the adoption of the Rules, Clark indicated that he opposed displace-
ment of the Rules by state law.4 2-
II. Clark's Judicial Record
A. Merger of Law and Equity
To a considerable extent, Judge Clark's decisions on the merger of
law and equity and the right to jury trial corresponded with his
prior views. Thus, he invariably disparaged lingering conceptual dis-
tinctions between the two judicial systems. In the early case of Beaunit
Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp.,4-1 he held for the court that
refusal to grant a jury trial was not appealable prior to final judgment.
He did this in the face of a Supreme Court precedent which treated
a similar interlocutory decision as an injunction, issued by an equity
judge to stay an action at law, which could be appealed.4 4 Clark felt
that there were grounds to distiiguish the precedent, but he also be-
lieved that the theory underlying it had been rendered obsolete by
the merger of law and equity, and he viewed Beaunit as an opportunity
to say so. Judge Jerome Frank had reservations about rejecting a
Supreme Court precedent, at least when unnecessary, but Clark over-
rode his objections, 4 5 and the opinion denounced the injunction
theory.46
Clark's zeal to remove these distinctions was heightened by Frank's
opinion in Bereslavsky v. Caffey47 for a panel of which Clark was not
a member. In a brief digression, Frank insisted that law and equity
had not been fully merged, and that their continued separation aided
legal development. 48 This dictum, and its popularity among commen-
tators, enraged Clark. He ridiculed it both off the bench 49 and in
42. 1938 WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 29, at 49. For Clark's view on the
application of the Rules to actions by or against the United States, see id. at 50. For
his forecast of the way in which the Rules would be administered, see Clark, Handmaid,
supra note 6.
43. 124 F.2d 563, 565 (2d Cir. 1942).
44. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
45. Memoranda in Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d
Cir. 1942) (Dec. 13 & 31, 1941). For every case on which he sat, Clark wrote memoranda
to his fellow judges. Each memorandum is cited to the decision which it accompanied
and is contained in the case files of the Charles Clark Papers, Yale Law Library.
Unless otherwise noted, all case memoranda were written by Clark.
46. 124 F.2d at 565-66.
47. 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947).
48. Id. at 500.
49. Letter to Arthur Corbin (Dec. 2, 1952); Clark, Book Review, 97 U. PA. L. REV.
917, 919 (1949).
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his opinion in Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.5"
There, a lower court relying on Bereslavsky had ruled that a stock-
holder's derivative action, traditionally an equitable proceeding, could
not be used to obtain treble damages under the antitrust laws. In his
opinion overturning this ruling, Clark managed both to narrow
Bereslavsky and to criticize it as "nostalgic dicta."51
So eager was Clark to promote the merger of law and equity that
he sought to achieve as a judge reforms rejected by those who en-
acted the Rules. As Reporter, he had tried unsuccessfully to give
judges the power to order trial by jury in all cases, '2 a reform which
would have reduced the need to make fine distinctions between law
and equity. After allowing 25 years to pass, Clark revived this idea
in a draft opinion in DeGioia v. United States Lines Co.,53 rejecting
a party's complaint that a jury trial had improperly been forced upon
him. Judge Henry Friendly doubted the basis for the ruling and
Clark retreated, relying on a narrower ground for the same result.14
But he soon resurrected the point in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines
Co., this time putting his views on record in a dissenting opinion.?
Not all the issues relating to merger and jury trial were so easy
for Clark; some gave him sufficient difficulty that he eventually
changed his views. One was mainly technical. In speeches shortly
after adoption of the Rules, Clark contended that under the new
regime certain "equity cases," once begun without a jury, would
remain without one, even though legal relief also was sought.51 Since
this was the established practice prior to merger, his position con-
formed to the historical test that he espoused. He apparently failed to
notice, however, that it was in conflict with another of his basic
principles of merger-that the right to a jury should be determined
as to each claim for relief rather than by characterizing the action
as a whole. In Beaunit he corrected this doctrinal discrepancy by
rejecting the purely historical test, as had Professor Moore. (This, in
turn, required him to decide how to adjudicate an issue which related
to both equitable and legal claims. He again followed Moore's pre-
50. 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
51. Id. at 734.
52. P. 917 supra.
53. 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
54. Memorandum in DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962)
(June 6, 1962).
55. 306 F.2d 461, 475-78 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
See also Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1948) (Clark, J.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 813 (1948) (jury trial not waived by mixing legal and equitable claims, because
such a rule would resurrect "the ancient divisions now abolished").
56. 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 275-76, 327.
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scription, making the "basic" nature of the issue decisive.) 7
Another point on which Clark's perspective altered over time in-
volved a more significant conflict among his values: would amend-
ment of a complaint by shifting from equitable to legal relief start
a new period in which to claim jury trial? Allowing this would em-
phasize the distinction between law and equity, but to disallow the
new time limit would make the initial pleading unduly decisive.
Accordingly, in the second edition of his text on Code Pleading, he
proposed a moderate test of waiver based on the reasonable foresee-
ability that a jury issue might arise.05 Perhaps it was Judge Frank's
opinion in Bereslavsky that pushed Clark to a more negative position.
By the early 1950's he had decided that no amendment could revive
the right to claim a jury trial unless the amended complaint dealt
with an entirely different factual situation. He tried to write this
doctrine into law, not only through a change in the Federal Rules,59
but also by an opinion for the court in Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Ryan.60 Both
ventures failed. Judge (later Justice) Harlan insisted that Alcoa be
decided on the modest ground that the suit had been at law from
the start,"t and the Advisory Committee did not report his proposal
to the Supreme Court.02
B. Pleading
By contrast, Judge Clark's record on pleading consisted of virtually
unremitting pursuit of his aims as a scholar and draftsman of the
Rules. He continued to insist that a well-drafted complaint need
contain only a concise general statement of the pertinent facts; it need
not include either factual details or legal theories. He asserted these
views in widely distributed writings, in lectures to practitioners, as
Reporter to the Advisory Committee, 3 and in his judicial decisions.64
57. 124 F.2d at 565-66.
58. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 117-20 (2d ed. 1947).
59. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
roR Tin: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 39-40 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 1954 PRE-
LIMINARY DRAFT].
60. 211 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1954).
61. Memoranda from Judge Harlan in Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Ryan, 211 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1954) (Mar. 9 & 17, 1954).
62. The 1955 Advisory Committee recommendations did not contain Clark's proposal.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE,
REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 REPORT].
63. E.g., id. at 18-19; Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1943).
64. E.g., Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1948); Lewis
v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1939) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 660 (1940).
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His most famous opinion on this subject was Dioguardi v. Durn-
ing,65 in which the court reversed dismissal of a complaint by a person
of limited literacy who refused legal assistance. It found sufficient al-
legations that the Collector of Customs "sold my merchandise to
another bidder with my price of $110, and not his price of $120,"
and that "three weeks before the sale, two cases, of 19 bottles each
case, disappeared."' 6 Considering the furor it caused, Clark's opinion
was surprisingly terse and bland. Indeed, he deliberately abstained
from expressing his views at length, explaining that "I have done
too much preaching already,"6 7 and, at Judge Thomas Swan's request,
he removed one of the few caustic lines in his draft opinion, a criti-
cism of the United States Attorney for quoting the terms of the Field
Code6" rather than the Federal Rules. 9 Nor was the holding itself
particularly remarkable; it was joined by Swan and Augustus Hand,
two especially level-headed judges.
Both in subject matter and in breadth of discussion, Clark's opinion
in Nagler v. Admiral Corp.70 was much more significant. In the latter
half of the 1950's, certain judges of 'he Southern District of New
York, encouraged by defense counsel, began a campaign for greater
precision in antitrust complaints. 'Clark saw this as a serious threat,
not only to his long-maintained stand against special pleading, but
also to the vindication of antitrust claims, a policy he endorsed. Con-
sequently, in speeches at institutes of judges and lawyers he sought to
combat the trend.7  Nagler, in which an antitrust complaint had
been dismissed for faulty pleading, gave Clark the additional oppor-
tunity of writing his views into law. Initially, the other judges on
the panel, Harrie Chase and Carroll Hincks, voted that Hincks would
write an opinion affirming dismissal.72 Hincks was a cautious and
conscientious judge, however, and after pondering for nearly three
months the arguments and citations Clark furnished him, he not only
came over to Clark's side, with Chase following him, but also offered
65. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
66. Id. at 779.
67. Memorandum in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (Dec. 28, 1943).
68. In general, Clark admired the Field Code, a code of civil procedure adopted by
New York in 1848 and by many other states subsequently, but he regarded its pleading
provisions as greatly inferior to those of the Federal Rules. See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADIN(,
21-31, 225-45 (2d ed. 1947).
69. Memorandum in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (Dec. 31, 1943).
70. 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
71. Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson's Paper on the Place of the Pleading in a
Proper Definition of the Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 435 (1958); Clark, Special
Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957).
72. Letter to Judge Alfred P. Murrah (July 22, 1957).
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the opinion to Clark.7 3 After disposing of the case itself in one para-
graph, Clark observed that "because of their practical importance in
routine litigation, we think some elaboration of both the pleading and
the joinder issues is desirable," and then wrote four pages detailing his
views on pleading.7 4 Clark later expressed satisfaction that this de-
cision had at least temporarily halted the campaign for special plead-
ing in antitrust cases.75
This should not suggest that for Clark any pleading was sufficient.
From the time the Federal Rules were adopted, he had asserted that
there were limits to the generality of allegation they allowed. 0 He
enforced this warning for the first time in 1950 in Anderson v. United
States,77 a First Circuit case on which he sat as a visiting judge.s
In a counterclaim against the Government, a delinquent debtor com-
plained of "demands ... for bribes, blackmail and the falsification
of records, as more fully set forth in the defendant's request . . .
for presentation of the evidence to the grand jury." 70 Clark ruled that
this allegation was too incoherent to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).80
At least rhetorically, Clark asserted these limits on simplified plead-
ing with increasing rigor as the 1950's progressed. In the 1955 report
of the Advisory Committee, he repeatedly insisted that the Federal
Rules required the pleading of acftual events and circumstances8s One
year later, in United States v. Lamont,s" he issued a dictum against "a
formalism of generality" that confuses "general pleadings with entire
absence of statement of claim." Periodically thereafter, indeed in
Nagler itself,83 he denounced the "notice theory of pleading" as alien
to the Rules.s4
This evidence suggests that Clark became stricter about pleading
as he grew older. But his sterner tone may have signified a tactical
shift rather than a change of heart. In the 1950's Clark faced a
serious assault on Rule 8(a), not only from those who sought precise
73. Memorandum in Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957) (Sept. 6,
1957).
74. 248 F.2d at 322, 323-26.
75. Letter to Julius Abeson (Oct. 14, 1957).
76. See pp. 917-18 supra.
77. 182 F.2d 296 (Ist Cir. 1950).
78. Clark may have felt freer to sign a restrictive pleading opinion in a foreign
jurisdiction.
79. 182 F.2d at 297 n.2.
80. Id. at 297.
81. 1955 REPORT, supra note 62, at 19.
82. 236 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1956).
83. 248 F.2d at 324.
84. E.g., Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. RFv. 435, 450
n.68 (1958).
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pleading in antitrust cases, but also from a group of California judges
and lawyers who proposed restoration of the more demanding Field
Code formulation in all cases.85 Clark may have decided to fend off
these challenges by deemphasizing the liberality of existing law. After
Anderson, he never again carried through on his harsh language by
actually ordering a complaint dismissed for loose pleading.
Clark also persisted in his prior view that the penalties for er-
roneous pleading ought to be minimized. He repeatedly read Rule 15
to allow amendment of pleadings without any adverse consequences
to the pleader.8 6 When remedies alone were at issue, he invariably
cited Rule 54(c) to the effect that even formal amendment of plead-
ings was unnecessary. 7 When neither of these Rules was available,
Clark sometimes simply recharacterized the prior proceedings to make
them sufficient from the outset.88
The flavor of Clark's approach is conveyed by Truth Seeker Co. v.
Durning,s9 which he later used in his casebook on pleading to illus-
trate the operation of Rule 54(c).9o A customs office had seized an
incoming shipment of atheistic literature. The owner sued for delivery
of the material, but since the office soon complied with this request
the district court dismissed the action as moot. The plaintiff appealed
solely in order to obtain costs. Not only did Clark assent to that
request, but, his civil libertarian instincts91 apparently aroused, he
contended that the district court also should have granted damages,92
though the plaintiff had never sought them at any stage of the case.
He found that the boilerplate request in the complaint for "such
other and further relief" was sufficient and furthermore that Rule
54(c) made a more explicit demand unnecessary. 3 Clark persuaded
a doubtful Judge Frank to join him,94 but Judge Chase dissented.
Most of these cases turned on their facts, but Technical Tape Corp.
v. Minnesota Mining &d Mlg. Co.95 raised a general issue. The district
85. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules?, 14 OHIo ST. L.J.
241, 245 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments].
86. E.g., SEC v. Rapp, 304 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1962); Vernon Lumber Corp. v.
Harcen Constr. Co., 155 F.2d 348, 349 (2d Cir. 1946).
87. E.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir.,
1958); Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 1946).
88. E.g., Pettus v. Grace Line, Inc., 305 F.2d 151, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1962) (Clark, J.,
dissenting); Rashap v. Brownell, 229 F.2d 193, 194-95 (2d Cir. 1956).
89. 147 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1945).
90. C. CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEADINc 56-59 (1952).
91. See ScHicK, supra note 2, at 277-90.
92. 147 F.2d at 56.
93. Id.
94. Memorandum of Judge Frank in Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 147 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1945) (Dec. 18, 1944).
95. 200 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1952).
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judge had dismissed the complaint for failure to allege a concrete con-
troversy and had refused to allow the allegations to be supplemented
under Rule 15(d), citing a prior Second Circuit holding that a de-
fective complaint could not be supplemented. On appeal, the majority
reversed on the ground that the original complaint had been ade-
quate, °° but Clark was far too offended by this gloss on the Rules
to let the issue pass. In a concurring opinion, he denounced the
holding that a defective complaint might not be supplemented and
dismissed the Second Circuit precedent as poorly considered.97 He
later persuaded the Advisory Committee to propose an amendment to
the Rules supporting his position,9s one of the 1955 proposals that
was shelved by the Supreme Court but subsequently adopted in
1963.00
C. Pretrial Practice
Pretrial practice is another subject on which Judge Clark almost
invariably pursued views developed prior to his appointment. In-
deed, so strong were these views that at times he adhered to them
even when they conflicted with the Rules themselves. The pattern
was most apparent in cases in which the facts were arguably irrele-
vant or not in dispute. Clark repeatedly insisted that trials be dis-
pensed with in such cases and advocated the use of Rule 56 summary
judgment for this purpose rather than the devices found in Rule 12,
which involved judgment on the pleadings or dismissal for failure to
state a claim.
The pattern appeared first in cases dealing with the relationship
between Rules 12 and 56. When the Rules were drafted, Clark had
urged unsuccessfully that all pretrial motions be heard at the same
time, when the facts were fully available. Once the Rules went into
effect, he adopted the even more ambitious objective of equating Rule
12 to Rule 56 or abolishing Rule 12 altogether. He pursued these
aims on the bench as well as in published writings and through
the Advisory Committee. 10 0 In a series of decisions he tried to es-
tablish that if affidavits were available a motion ought not to be
96. Id. at 878.
97. Id. at 879.
98. 1955 REPORT, supra note 62, at 22-23.
99. 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE f 15.1612], at 1085-87 (2d ed. 1975); p. 928 infra. For
a case in which Clark did not allow a complaint to be supplemented, see United States
v. Wissahickon Tool Works, 200 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1952).
100. Clark, Experience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 8 F.R.D. 497, 500-01 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Clark, Experience Under the
Amendments]; Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 471-72 (1943).
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decided on the pleadings alone, that affidavits could be used whether
the motion was under Rule 12 or Rule 56, and that if both motions
were made they ought to be considered together. 0 -1
None of these cases was more important than one on which he
did not sit. Shortly after Judge Frank joined the court in 1941, he
asked Clark's reaction to a conference memorandum Frank was writing
which argued that affidavits could not be used on a motion under
Rule 12. Greatly distressed, Clark responded that such a ruling would
restore the worst of the demurrer practice abolished by the Rules.
When he received no answer, he wrote Frank again and asked for a
chance to present his views to the other sitting judges.10 2 This proved
unnecessary, for the subsequent opinion in Boro Hall Corp. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.,10 written by Judge Augustus Hand, held explicitly
that affidavits could be considered on a Rule 12 motion.
With these precedents Clark had largely achieved his purpose. Never-
theless, he sought to affirm his victory with a compromise amendment
to Rule 12,104 finally adopted in 1946, providing that if affidavits
were submitted on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), it ought instead
to be treated as a Rule 56 motion.10 5
A related reform that Clark resolved to complete as a judge was
to ensure that motions going to the merits, whether under Rule 56
or Rule 12, would be granted liberally. As a draftsman of the Rules,
Clark would have strengthened summary judgment by putting on
the opposing party the burden of offering specific proofs rather than
general allegations. 10 Undaunted by his failure to obtain explicit
language in Rule 56 to this effect, Clark inserted it in a series of
opinions, headed by Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.10 7 Not satisfied with
these efforts, he also attempted again, in the 1955 amendments pro-
posed by the Advisory Committee, to write his approach into the
Rules. 08 This proposal was finally enacted in 1963.100
101. E.g., Cohen v. American Window Glass Co., 126 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1942); Central
Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1940).
102. Letters from Judge Frank (Nov. 17 & 25, 1941); letters to Judge Frank (Nov.
19 & 24, 1941).
103. 124 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
104. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 465-67 (1943).
105. Clark, Experience Under the Amendments, supra note 100, at 500-01; 2A MooRE's
FEDERAL PRAcTICE ff 12.01 [7], at 2211-12 (2d ed. 1975).
106. Pp. 918-19 supra.
107. 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943). For additional examples, see Rotberg v. Dodwell &
Co., 152 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1945); Nahtel Corp. v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 141
F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1944).
108. 1955 REPORT, supra note 62, at 56-59. For further exposition of his views, see
Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments, supra note 85, at 241.
109. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 56.01[13], at 56-21 (2d ed. 1975).
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The question of burden of proof was only one facet of the larger
issue of how substantial a factual dispute would suffice to preclude
summary judgment. In a series of divided decisions on this issue be-
tween 1944 and 1947, Clark invariably insisted that the motion be
granted. Most of the cases involved copyright claims, of which he
was innately skeptical, but the major issue for Clark was procedural.
Indeed, he saw much of his reform program, including simplified
pleading and abolition of the dilatory pleas, as dependent upon a
liberal use of Rule 56.110 Unfortunately for Clark, Judges Learned
Hand and Frank strongly opposed his views, and Judge Swan was his
only ally. The result was a bitter battle within the Second Circuit.
The first case was MacDonald v. Du Ma urier,"'1 in which the de-
fendant was accused of basing her renowned novel, Rebecca, on an
obscure melodrama. Swan initially sided with Clark but later joined
Learned Hand in opposition."12 The controversy within the panel
actually concerned the merits of whether the similarities between the
two novels were so gTeat as to constitute improper use under copy-
right law, not whether this or any other issue could be decided only
after a full trial."13 Yet in his dissenting opinion Clark wrote at con-
siderable length as if summary judgment itself were at stake."- After-
ward, he privately characterized the majority position as highly dan-
gerous.13
Next was Madeirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber
Co.,1"" a genuine summary judgment case. The panel disagreed over
the question whether, in computing damages for breach of a contract
to sell lumber, the district court correctly calculated the market value
of the lumber on the motion papers alone."17 At first, Clark was so
eager for a unanimous decision supporting the principle of summary
judgment that he was willing to take the contract price of the lumber
as its market value, eliminating recovery for the appellee on this
element of the damages. Even when his bid for Judge Frank's vote
failed, he was concerned that the decision be as acceptable as possible,
and after conferring with Professor Moore, he suggested to Judge
Swan that they allow the seller another opportunity to offer proof of
110. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting);
Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. RE'. 567, 578 (1952).
111. 144 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944).
112. Memorandum of Judge Swan in MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 44 F.2d 696 (2d
Cir. 1944) (June 14, 1944).
113. Id.
114. 144 F.2d at 701-03.
115. Letter to Judge Frank (May 4, 1945).
116. 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945).
117. Id. at 404-07.
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a different figure. Since Swan thought the concession unnecessary,""
the opinion came down as a simple affirmance.
Clark's campaign for liberal summary judgment suffered a severe
setback less than four months later in Doehler Metal Furniture Co.
v. United States,'" a case in which lie did not sit. Judges Learned
Hand and Frank combined with Judge Chase to deprecate summary
judgment as a risky expedient. Not only did they hold against grant-
ing it when there was the "slightest doubt" about the facts;'" they
disparaged Madeirense itself in language that was toned down only
after Clark complained to Hand about it.1 2 '
Thus the stage was set for the confrontation between Clark and
Judges Frank and Learned Hand in Arnstein v. Porter. '-'2 An eccen-
tric old composer had brought another in a long series of plagiarism
suits, this time charging that Cole Porter had stolen from him bits
of such tunes as Begin the Beguine and Night and Day. One issue
was whether the plaintiff, who had failed to extract an admission
of copying from the defendant by deposition and whose own evidence
on that issue lacked any credibility, should have another chance to
testify and to examine Porter at trial. A second question, assuming
that copying might be proved, was whether the compositions were
so similar that the issue of improper use ought also to be decided
only after trial. Clark and Frank immediately took opposing sides in
a heated exchange of memoranda, and after considerable reflection
Hand joined Frank in denying summary judgment.:'2 3 Clark's dis-
senting opinion revealed how strongly he felt about the issue. He
referred to "the anti-intellectual and book-burning nature of [the]
decision" and characterized the "slightest doubt" gloss on Rule 56
as "ad hoc legislation.' ' 2 4 Many years later, he still objected in bitter
terms to the majority opinion . 2 5
Clark recovered some ground one year later in California Apparel
Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc. 20 A group of California cloth-
iers sought to prevent their New York counterparts from using the
name "California" to lure away customers. Clark wrote that a trial
118. Memoranda by Judge Swan in Madeirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick
Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1945) (Dec. 20 & 29, 1944).
119. 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945).
120. Id. at 135.
121. Letter from Judge Frank (May 4, 1945).
122. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
123. Memorandum of Judge Clark (Jan. 14 8. 15, 1946), Judge Frank (Jan. 11, 15 & 16,
1946), and Judge Learned Hand (Jan. 18, 1946) in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464
(2d Cir. 1946).
124. 154 F.2d at 478-80.
125. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments, supra note 85, at 249.
126. 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
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was unwarranted since the plaintiffs had not offered specific evi-
dence of harm to each individual business. 127 He again had Judge
Swan on his side, with Judge Learned Hand dissenting. The pre-
vious bitterness surfaced only when Clark asked Hand to delete from
his dissent a stern condemnation of unduly liberal summary judg-
ment. Hand reluctantly agreed to soften his language.128
Thereafter, the battle within the Second Circuit subsided. Clark
never again had occasion as a sitting judge to disagree with his
colleagues over a denial of summary judgment. 1" He feared, how-
ever, that district judges were no longer granting summary judgment
as freely as they should.130 His proposed amendment in 1955 1:' to
Rule 56 was meant to reverse this trend.
On one other aspect of summary judgment Clark sought to use
his authority as a judge to promote a reform he had failed to achieve
as draftsman. The Advisory Committee had decided not to allow plain-
tiffs to move for summary judgment in advance of pleading by de-
fendants. The resulting text of Rule 56(a) was too unequivocal to
give Clark scope for liberal interpretation. At the first opportunity,
in United States v. Adler's Creamery, Inc.,"3 2 he wrote a separate
opinion that discussed the disadvantages of the restriction and advo-
cated amendment of the Rule. Within a decade, his view was adopted
in an amendment to Rule 56(a).133
When the aim of the pretrial proceedings was to expose the facts
prior to trial, Clark again sought to complete reforms he had achieved
only partially as Reporter to the Advisory Committee. In the drafting
process, Clark had fought strenuously against reliance on pleadings
and traditional motions for getting at the facts, deeming modern
methods to be much more effective. 13 4 As a judge, he continued to
support the deposition and discovery devices provided in Rules 26-
37 13 and to disparage both the bill of particulars and the less onerous
127. Id. at 900-01.
128. Memorandum in California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 162
F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947) (Aug. 4, 1947).
129. He still criticized them privately in cases on which he did not sit. Letters to
Judges Medina and Waterman (Dec. 27, 1955). For one of several cases in which Clark
himself opposed summary judgment, see Anderson v. United States, 182 F.2d 296 (1st
Cir. 1950).
130. Letter to Judge Frank (Nov. 12, 1948).
131. P. 928 supra.
132. 107 F.2d 987, 991-92 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 657 (1940).
133. 6 MoORE's FEDERAL PRACcE f 56.01[3-4], at 56-15 to 56-16 (2d ed. 1975). As
amended in 1946, Rule 56(a) allows plaintiffs to move for summary judgment in advance
of the defendant's pleading. Fa. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
134. See pp. 917-19 supra.
135. See Moseller v. United States, 158 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1946); Engl v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943).
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motion for a more definite statement; he even complained that judges
were too literal in applying Rule 12(e), which authorized the latter
pleas.' 36 He finally persuaded the Advisory Committee to propose an
amendment, adopted in 1946, that abolished the bill of particulars
and narrowed the motion for a more definite statement.1 37
In his only case concerning use of pretrial proceedings under Rule
16 to simplify matters in dispute, Clark faced a much more perplexing
conflict between his basic values of efficiency and of deciding cases
on their merits. In Padovani v. Britchhausen,r as the district judge
had persistently demanded of the plaintiff a written pretrial state-
ment of the legal theories underlying his cancer claim against a cigar-
ette company. When the plaintiff failed to satisfy the judge, the latter
issued a pretrial order effectively barring the plaintiff from trying
his claim.'39 This ruling troubled Clark. He was devoted to Rule 16,
and to trial court discretion generally, as aids to judicial efficiency.
He also admired the trial judge and his efforts to clear up docket
congestion.140 Yet for years Clark had strongly opposed the use of
pretrial proceedings either to refine pleadings or to suppress litigation
on the merits.' 4 1 Moreover, he felt that the local district courts were
seeking to dispose of onerous claims by reversion to special pleading.
(He had repulsed one threat in Nagler,'4 2 and had attempted to coun-
ter another by opposing the new pretrial rules in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.)' 43 He sought to resolve his dilemma in Padovani
by the extraordinary expedient of calling the district judge to urge
withdrawal of the order.144 When this device failed, Clark wrote a
136. See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1957); FTC v. Biddle
Purchasing Co., 117 F.2d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1941) (Clark, J., concurring); Clark, The Bar
and the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure, 25 A.B.A.J. 22, 23-24 (1939). The original
Rule 12(e) did not contain the present language, added in 1946, stating that a motion
for a more definite statement is proper only -if a pleading to which a responsive plead-
ing is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required
to frame a responsive pleading.' Fro. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (1946). See 2A MOORE's FEDnRL
PkGrICE 4[ 12.17[l], at 2359-62, [ 12.18[1], at 2387 (2d ed. 1975). The original rule al-
thorized the trial judge to grant this motion in a much wider range of circumstances.
Id. q 12.17[l], at 2360-61. Clark feared that judges were insisting on excessive details in
the pleading. He preferred that details be disclosed in discovery and depositions. See
Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1957).
137. Clark, Experience Under the Amendinent. supra note 100, at 500-01; 2A MOORL's
FEDERAL PRAcGCE 'f 12.17[1], at 2359, 12.18[1], at 2387 (2d ed. 1975). See note 136 supra.
138. 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961).
139. Id. at 547.
140. Memoranda in Padovani v. Bruchlihausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961) (June 27
& July 5, 1961).
141. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIo ST. L.J. 163, 167-68 (1956);
Clark, Pre-Trial Orders and Pre-Trial as a Part of Trial, 23 F.R.D. 506, 510 (1958).
142. Pp. 924-25 supra.
143. Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, 29 F.R.D. 454 (1961).
144. Memorandum in Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961) (July
5, 1961).
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long opinion that invalidated the order but softened the blow with
assurances of support for judicial efficiency.145
D. Joinder and Parties
To a lesser degree, Judge Clark's record on joinder and party issues
corresponded with views he had developed as a scholar and rulemaker.
Thus, he repeatedly read the Rules to permit wide joinder of causes
or parties."; This tendency was particularly apparent in cases involv-
ing restrictions on the jurisdiction of federal courts which might in-
hibit joinder. The problem arose when one claim was within a dis-
trict court's jurisdiction and another, viewed separately, was not.
Clark almost invariably held that the second claim could be brought
in the district court if it were joined to the first claim.
One line of cases involved the special instance of a tort claim under
state law joined to a federal patent, copyright, or trademark claim.
In his first case of this type, Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc.,14T Clark
stated in dissent that for him the only consideration was procedural
economy; so long as the ti'o claims had a substantial factual overlap,
jurisdiction over both was warranted.4 He never wavered from this
view, but in numerous subsequent cases he was unable to persuade
his colleagues.' 40 Therefore, shortly after World War II, he joined
Professor Moore in promoting a statute, now 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), that
gave the federal courts jurisdiction over a claim of unfair competition
joined to a "related" claim under the copyright, patent, or trademark
laws. Fearing that he might not be assigned the first cases under the
new law, Clark distributed a long memorandum to his colleagues ex-
plaining the statute and imploring them to construe it generously.1 50
At first he found himself again, in dissent in Kleinman v. Betty Dain
Creations, Inc.lal But Clark's position triumphed in 1952, as the panel
145. 293 F.2d at 547-51. For another case involving pretrial procedures that presented
Clark with a similar conflict of values, see Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957).
146. Cases on joinder not discussed in this section include Nagler v. Admiral Corp.,
248 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir. 1957) (allegation of conscious parallelism among 26 corporate
defendants justifies permissive joinder, without regard to legal theories pleaded); Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc. v. McMahon, 235 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1956) (person suing as
federal statutory representative of seaman's dependents subject to counterclaim as general
representative of seaman's estate).
147. 108 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 660 (1940).
148. Id. at 18-21.
149. E.g., Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
738 (1944) (Clark, J., dissenting); Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d
9, 11 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641 (1942); Treasure Imports,
Inc. v. Henry Amdur & Sons, 127 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J., dissenting).
150. Memorandum to Second Circuit judges (Jan. 23, 1951).
151. 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).
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in Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi'52 read the statute to authorize broad
joinder.
Another line of cases involved aspects of ancillary jurisdiction, in-
cluding diversity of citizenship and venue requirements. Clark's first
opinion on the subject, Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp.,1' 3 held
merely that a counterclaim clearly compulsory under Rule 13(a) did
not require its own basis for venue. Clark supplemented this, how-
ever, with a full discussion of the policy and precedents supporting
broad joinder." 4 Moreover, he sought to extend the holding to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction as well as venue and to counterclaims only
arguably compulsory. Judge Learned Hand prevented him from ar-
ticulating these views,"' but he did manage to insert a good deal
of suggestive language." 6
Ten years later, with a more friendly panel of fellow Connecticut
judges, Clark was able to extend the ruling openly. In United Artists
Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, Inc, 1 7 he declared that compulsory
counterclaims did not need their own basis of subject matter juris-
diction. He construed the last phrase in Rule 13(a), barring counter-
claims against "third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction," as referring only to personal jurisdiction.'5s He also defined
compulsory counterclaims exceedingly broadly: Rule 13(a)'s require-
ment of a single "transaction or occurrence" was satisfied if the facts
of the two claims were related "logically."' 59 Thus, in United Artists
it was sufficient for ancillary jurisdiction that the counterclaim ad-
duced, as one piece of evidence of a plan to violate the defendant's
rights, the filing of the original claim by the plaintiff in collaboration
with the third-party defendants.'0
Under the circumstances, one might have supposed that Friend v.
Middle Atlantic Transp. Co.' was particularly painful for Clark.
He held that Rule 14 exceeded statutory limits by authorizing an-
cillary jurisdiction over a third-party defendant impleaded solely on
account of liability to the original plaintiff. In his opinion Clark re-
peatedly expressed reluctance to limit impleader. He wrote as if com-
152. 197 F.2d 757, 759-61 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 860 (1954).
153. 144 F.2d 968, 973-75 (2d Cir. 1944).
154. Id. at 973-77.
155. Memoranda in Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944) (Aug.
8 & 18, 1944).
156. 144 F.2d at 975-77.
157. 221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 1955).
158. Id. at 216-17.
159. Id. at 217.
160. Id. at 214, 217.
161. 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946).
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pelled by scholarly opinion and kept his holding narrow, excluding
related cases in which the third-party defendant might be liable for
contribution.' 62 In a private letter, he suggested that he had been
talked into this position by his academic colleague, Professor Moore,
to whom he had turned for advice. 103 Yet Clark probably approved
of the holding. While the Rules were being drafted, he had objected
to the impleader of third-party defendants liable only to the original
plaintiff,6 4 and a decade later he joined the Advisory Committee in
urging that this form of joinder be abolished, a proposal pending at
the time Friend was decided? °5 A memorandum to the other judges
on the panel reveals that Clark's reluctance to limit Rule 14 was
mainly due to his desire not to let down fellow reformers who favored
expansive impleader.16
Clark was not satisfied simply to allow joinder desired by the parties.
His desire to compel them, in certain situations, to combine their
claims is illustrated by his unfolding views concerning res judicata
in class suits. Since he expressed few ideas on this subject before
coming to the bench, he was more likely to change his mind here
than in other contexts. During his first decade as a judge, he took
a conventional approach; in terms now obsolete, he asserted that
"true" and "hybrid" class suits would support ancillary jurisdiction
and bind the entire class, while "spurious" class suits would do
neither. 6 7 As scholarly thought gradually shifted in favor of giving
greater effect to spurious class suits, however, so did Clark's. In the
early 1950's he began exploring the possibility of imposing res judicata
162. Id. at 780. In support of his criticism of Rule 14, Clark cited Professor Moore
and the Advisory Committee's proposal for an amendment of the Rule. Id.
163. Letter to Armistead Dobie (Mar. 8, 1946).
164. P. 919 supra.
165. Clark, The Amended Federal Rules, 15 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 1, 2 (1948); Clark,
Experience Under the Amendments, supra note 100, at 499.
166. Memorandum in Friend .,. Middle At. Trans. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Feb. 15, 1946).
167. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 895
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947); Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch,
116 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1940).
Prior to its amendment in 1966, Rule 23 provided for three types of class actions.
A "true" class action involved an action to support a right that was joint, common,
or secondary in the sense that the owner of the primary right declined to enforce it,
thereby entitling members of the class to do so. The class action was "hybrid" when
the right to be enforced was "several" but the object of the action was the settlement
of claims affecting property involved in the action. "Spurious" class suits involved
actions that contained common questions of law or fact and asked for common relief,
although they involved "several" rights. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAiccer f" 23.01l]-[13]
(2d ed. 1975). The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 abolished these categories of class
actions based on jural rights and substituted more practical criteria for permitting
class actions. Id.
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on all members of the spurious class, assuming that notice and repre-
sentation were adequate.0 8 He also supported an amendment to the
Rules that provided for proper notice and representation in class suits
as a means of facilitating binding judgments.0 9
Clark never actually held a judgment in a spurious class suit to be
res judicata. Instead he expanded use of the "true" and "hybrid"
categories, to which res judicata clearly applied. Stella v. Kaiser,' " a
typical case, presented the question of whether a judicially-approved
compromise in a stockholders' derivative suit was binding against
the plaintiffs in a second suit against a director who had been dropped
as defendant in the prior suit. Clark's initial negative reaction was
perhaps motivated by his hostility to manipulative corporate direc-
tors.17 1 As he prepared a draft opinion, however, he recalled Rule
23(a), which suggested to him that the original stockholders' deriva-
tive suit had been both a plaintiffs' and a defendants' "true" class
action." 2 Clark found that this was the most satisfactory ground for
deciding the case, although none of the parties had characterized
the suit as a class action of any kind.173 Judges Learned Hand and
Frank concurred on a much more conventional ground.
On party questions other than joinder, Clark's judicial work again
reflected his longstanding views. He preferred a simple test of who
might sue, as illustrated by his reaction to a case on which he did
not sit, Edward B. Mlarks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.2
7 4
There, Judge Learned Hand, having acknowledged the rule that the
legal owner of a copyright had the right to sue, assumed for con-
venience in argument that under Rule 17(a) the "real party in in-
terest" might instead be the beneficiary of the copyright.' 75 Clark
immediately wrote Hand, protesting angrily that this assumption was
contrary to the Advisory Committee's understanding that the real party
in interest was simply the person with the right to sue under sub-
stantive law.' 70 When Hand replied that he had not held to the con-
168. See Cart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cerI. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959); Stella
v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cii-. 1954); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
169. 1955 REPORT, supra note 62, at 26-28.
170. 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954).
171. See letter to Paul Crouch (Feb. 28, 1944).
172. Memoranda in Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954) (Oct. 15 & 27, 1954).
Original Rule 23(a)(1) provided for "true" class actions. See note 167 supra.
173. 218 F.2d at 67.
174. 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944). Other examples are Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 618 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963); Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1940).
175. 140 F.2d at 269.
176. Letter to Judge Learned Hand (Jan. 29, 1944).
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trary, Clark insisted that he had done grave harm by raising the
question and intimating the wrong answer.1'77
In cases involving the substitution of parties, Clark also espoused
his liberal approach.17s He was not obstinate on this subject, how-
ever, and could defer when he felt that the law was clearly against
him. Vibra Brush Corp. v. Schaffer'7O involved the issue of whether,
under the Second Circuit's Rule 9 (which resembled Federal Rule
25(d)), the period for substituting government officials as defendants
began when the permanent successor took office or from the earlier
date when a temporary stand-in was installed. Clark believed that
when the actual defendant was the Government itself, substitution
should not be required until the permanent successor took office.
Indeed, he had persuaded the Advisory Committee to propose an
amendment to Rule 25(d) whereby no substitution whatever was
necessary in such cases, 8' and he regarded this as the most crucial
of the proposals not adopted by the Supreme Court in 1955.181 While
Vibra Brush was pending, however, the Supreme Court rendered a
pair of per curiam decisions, applying its own substitution rule (also
modeled after Rule 25(d)) and starting the time period at the ap-
pointment of temporary successors.'8 12 Clark's first instinct was to dis-
regard these rulings, in part on the ground that the Second Circuit's
Rule could be interpreted independently. Upon further consideration
he became persuaded that the Rules should be construed uniformly
and reluctantly concluded that the appeals had to be dismissed.a83
However, he assigned the opinion to himself and rebuked the Su-
preme Court, not only for its decisions but for having failed to amend
Rule 25(d).15 4 Ultimately Clark prevailed, as the amendment was
enacted in 1961.185
177. Letter from Judge Learned Hand (Jan. 31, 1944); letter to Judge Learned Hand
(Feb. 2, 1944).
178. E.g., Hirsch v. Bruchhausen, 284 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1960); Hackner v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 559 (1941).
179. 256 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1958).
180. 1955 REPORT, supra note 62, at 28-33.
181. See letter to Edmund Morgan (Apr. 6, 1953).
182. Klaw v. Schaffer, 357 U.S. 346 (1958); Glanzman v. Schaffer, 357 U.S. 347 (1958).
183. Memoranda in Vibra Brush Corp. v. Schaffer, 256 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1958)
(June 26, July 7 & 23, 1958).
184. 256 F.2d at 683-84.
185. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACICE , 25.0111], at 25-21 to 25-22 (2d ed. 1975).
Clark also expressed his views on various trial and appellate procedures. On the admis-
sion of pretrial depositions at trial (Rule 32(a)), see Klepal v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 F.2d
610 (2d Cir. 1956); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dis-
senting). On special verdicts and interrogatories (Rule 49), see Morris v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 187 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1951). On review of district court findings (Rule 52(a)),
see Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., con-
cutting); Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments, supra note 85, at 247. On the use of masters
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E. Rule 54(b)
The manner in which Clark handled piecemeal appeals under Rule
54(b) is the most illuminating aspect of this study.'10 The problem
arose when a district judge disposed of one of several claims or a
claim by or against one of several parties but retained the rest of the
action for further proceedings. The question was whether the loser
could appeal immediately or only after disposition of the entire suit.
On this issue, unlike most arising under the Rules, Clark came to
the bench without well-developed views. The issue came up repeatedly
and caused much controversy. The rule was substantially changed by
amendment after a decade, creating new interpretative difficulties.
As a result, Clark spent more time and energy developing his position
and underwent a more complex intellectual development than on
any other procedural problem with which he dealt as a judge. It
was also one of the issues about which he came to feel most strongly.
As originally adopted, Rule 54(b) provided: "When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, the court at any stage,
upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and
all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which
is the subject matter of the claim, may enter a judgment disposing of
such claim."' 87 According to Rule 54(a), this judgment was subject
to immediate appeal. Thus, whether a piecemeal appeal was permitted
under the Rules depended on the definitions of "claim" and "trans-
action or occurrence."
Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,'"8 Clark's first Rule 54(b)
case, showed his lack of well-developed views on the problem. The
trial court had dismissed a copyright action' 89 involving the contents
(Rule 53(b)), see De La Rama S.S. Co. v. United States, 206 F.2d 651, 656 (2d Cir. 1953)
(Clark, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Giannasca, 119 F.2d 756, 758 (2d Cir. 1941) (Clark, J.,
concurring); Clark, Difficulties Encountered in a System of Masters, 23 F.R.D. 569 (1958).
On the time for appeal (Rule 58), see Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517 (2d Cir.
1.956); F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. United States, 236 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd,
356 U.S. 227 (1958); United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, 200 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1952).
On district court revision of judgments affirmed by an appellate court (Rule 60), see
S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Perlman v. 322 West 72d St. Co., 127 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.
1942); Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments, supra note 85, at 250. On the trial of conden-
nation cases (Rule 71A), see United States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1957); United
States v. 44 Acres of Land, 234 F.2d 410, 416 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., concurring), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 916 (1956); Clark, The Proposed Condemnation Rule, 10 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1949).
186. Compare M. ScHicK, supra note 2, at 229-40, which contains less doctrinal anal)sis
but describes additional cases and goes into greater detail on the controversy between
Clark and Frank.
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1938).
188. 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939).
189. I use the term "action" instead of "claim" in order to avoid confusion with
the wording of Rule 54(b).
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of a book while an unfair competition action involving the title was
still pending.100 Clark never reached a firm conclusion on whether
the ruling was appealable. Indeed, his approach appeared to shift
halfway through deliberations on the case. Clark's first instinct, in
accord with his underlying procedural values, was to ask whether
convenience and economy would be served by allowing an immediate
appeal. He was also inclined, as usual, to defer to the trial judge's
view on this issue.' 0 ' These considerations pointed toward permitting
the appeal, the position he ultimately took in the case. But at the
urging of Professor Moore, whom he had consulted on the case, Clark's
attention shifted to matters of doctrinal logic. He became concerned
that if the word "claim" in Rule 54(b) were construed narrowly, the
same would have to be done on other issues, such as joinder, where
he definitely favored a broad definition.192 Rather than opposing
review, however, Clark wrote a concurring opinion asserting that the
same words might be interpreted differently in different contexts,
depending on their functions. 0 3
In his next major case on the issue, Sidis v. F-R Pub. Co1p.,194
Clark resolved his dilemma in the opposite way. He acknowledged
that if procedural convenience were the governing consideration, he
would have voted to allow the appeal.195 But now he emphasized
doctrinal consistency, suggesting in a separate statement that the same
words in different Rules could not be given a different interpretation.
An appropriately broad interpretation of the word "claim" meant that
the appeal should never have been heard. 96
This trend in Clark's development was strongly confirmed by
fusher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 07 in which the dis-
trict judge had dismissed an unfair competition action under state
law for lack of jurisdiction while a federal patent action was still
pending. The case presented itself to Clark primarily as a problem
of pendent jurisdiction, and since the concepts underlying that issue
were similar to those in Rule 54(b), the case underlined for Clark the
desirability of a doctrinally consistent approach. He was firmly com-
mitted to reading the concepts broadly for pendent jurisdiction pur-
190. 106 F.2d at 84.
191. Memorandum in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.
1939) (May 24, 1939).
192. Memorandum in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.
1939) (July 28, 1939).
193. 106 F.2d at 86-87.
194. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
195. 113 F.2d at 811.
196. Id.
197. 127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641 (1942).
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poses, asking merely whether there was a substantial factual overlap
between the actions. Applied to piecemeal appeals, this interpretation
would oblige him to deny review in the great majority of cases. Thus,
Clark not only dissented from the majority opinion sustaining the
appeal but announced that he had voted wrongly in Collins.19x
By 1943, in Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co.,199 Clark had brought
together his opposition to piecemeal appeals and his underlying pro-
cedural values. Perhaps his work with Professor Moore on an amend-
ment to Rule 54(b) focused his attention on the merits of the problem
and not just on doctrinal logic.2 0 0 He may also have been influenced
by the fact that his adversary, Judge Frank, was drafting a new statute
on interlocutory appeals, which took an approach that differed from
his own and Moore's. Whatever the explanation, although A udi Vision
was a simple case of nonappealability, Clark wrote an extensive opin-
ion on the entire topic of piecemeal appeals. He acknowledged, as he
had previously, that "undoubtedly there will be times when in the
actual posture of a case a short-cut ruling may be helpful." But he
was now satisfied that "in the long run fragmentary disposal of what
is essentially one matter is unfortunate . . .for the waste of time and
expense caused the parties and the courts." Moreover, he asserted,
"there is an unfortunate tendency under such a system to stress de-
cisions on pure points of procedure . . .with the unfortunate con-
sequence of shifting emphasis from merits to form.' 20 '
In subsequent cases Clark gradually put aside his concern for econ-
omy and increasingly opposed premature appeals because they promot-
ed excessive emphasis on procedural issues. 20 2 In this way, he came
to see his whole program of procedural reform as dependent upon
the restriction of piecemeal review. He again was opposed by Judge
Frank, who favored wider interlocutory appeal. These circumstances
led to another bitter clash within the Second Circuit.
In Zarati S.S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp.,2°1 Clark applied his views
to a case of multiple parties. The action against the charterer of a
ship was still pending, while those against the charterer's sales agent
and his financer had been dismissed. The majority allowed the ap-
peal on the ground that the defendants did not have "joint" inter-
198. Id. at 11-13.
199. 136 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1943).
200. See pp. 941-42 infra.
201. 136 F.2d at 625.
202. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indus. Corp., 154 F.2d 814 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 859 (1946); Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 905 (2d Cir. 1913)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 738 (1944).
203. 154 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1946).
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ests, 2''° but Clark contended in dissent that so long as the actions
turned substantially on common questions of fact they could not be
appealed separately. 2fl This was the same test he had previously
adopted for cases involving single parties.
In only one case under the original Rule 54(b), aside from Collins,
did Clark favor piecemeal appeal, and there his usual opposition was
greatly outweighed by another cherished procedural value. In Cali-
fornia Apparel Creators v. TVieder of California, Inc.,20 a California
trade association and 75 of its members brought an unfair compe-
tition suit against three New York corporations. Clark held that each
plaintiff's cause of action against each defendant was appealable sep-
arately.20- 7 This holding could not be reconciled with his prior de-
cisions, for the rest of his opinion concerned questions common to
all the parties. Clark's behavior may be explained by the fact that he
wished to portray the suit as a conglomeration of individual claims
in order to regain ground in his summary judgment campaign, fol-
lowing his defeat in Arnstein v. Porter.20s Moreover, an amendment
to Rule 54(b) was about to go into effect, and therefore the decision
had almost no precedential significance.
Clark had been working with Professor Moore on this amendment
to Rule 54(b) for some time. His original intention was to codify
his own views,'200 but later he became reconciled to a compromise
amendment, which went into effect in 1948 and provided:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or
more but less than all of the claims only upon an express de-
termination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the
claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims ....
204. Id. at 379. Original Rule 54(b) did not refer specifically to multiple parties.
P. 938 supra. The Rule allowed appeal of an action by or against one of several
parties only when it constituted a "claim" separate from the rest of the case. This
condition was absent, according to the prevailing view, whenever the multiple parties
had "joint interests," a test abounding in fine distinctions. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
71 54.23[4], at 257-60 (2d ed. 1975). A 1961 amendment made Rule 54(b) applicable to
multiple parties. Id. 54.29[1, at 426-27.
205. 154 F.2d at 381-82.
206. 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
207. Id. at 902.
208. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See pp. 930-31 supra.
209. See 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1i 54.26, at 301-03 (2d ed. 1975) (discussing the
amendment that would have codified Clark's views).
210. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1948).
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The latter decision thus was not immediately appealable.
The Advisory Committee Note suggests that the amendment served
three purposes. First, it strengthened the policy against premature re-
view by placing the burden of establishing no just reason for delay
on the losing parties.21 ' Unless the district judge faced the issue and
made a formal determination of finality, immediate review would
not be permissible. Second, the amendment provided a safety valve
for unusual cases in which the district judge thought immediate ap-
peal to be especially appropriate. 21 2 Clark later asserted that this as-
pect of the new Rule was purely a concession to his adversaries, par-
ticularly Judge Frank.2 13 But it is possible that Clark also sympathized
with the safety valve notion since it corresponded to his initial reac-
tion to the piecemeal appeals question in Collins.214 Third, the amend-
ment reduced the burden of procedural litigation for everyone in-
volved in the case. If the district judge did not make a determination
of finality, that was the end of the matter. Even if the judge did so,
in most cases that would also settle the issue, for the scope of allow-
able appeals was at least as broad under the amended rule as under
Frank's construction of original Rule 54(b).215
In fact, it was many years before the amendment settled the issue
of piecemeal appeals. The main point of controversy which developed
was whether even more orders were now potentially appealable than
under Judge Frank's view of the old Rule. In doctrinal terms, the
controversy turned on whether "claim" should be construed more
narrowly than by the previous jointness test used under the original
Rule.2 16 As a practical matter, this would determine whether dis-
missal of one of several parties was always separately appealable. If
so, the new Rule would be usable as a safety valve in the most pressing
situation of all, complete dismissal of a defendant. This approach
would also simplify disposition of procedural issues by providing an
easy solution in multiple party cases. On the other hand, a narrow
interpretation of the word "claim" would further weaken the policy
against piecemeal review and would be difficult to justify under the
language of the amendment, for no one had suggested that "claim"
was to be interpreted in a new way. Some even questioned the validity
211. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DiS-
TRI-r COURTS OF THE UNITED STAlrS 70-72 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946 REPORT].
212. Id.
213. Memorandum in Pabellon v. Grace Line, 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951) (July
20, 1951).
214. See pp. 938-39 supra.
215. 1946 REPORT, supra note 211, at 70-72.
216. See note 204 supra.
Vol. 85: 914, 1976
Judge Clark and the Federal Rules
of the Rule under this interpretation, claiming that it would enlarge
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals contrary to the spirit of
Rule 82.217
Clark's first discussion of amended Rule 54(b) as a judge was sur-
prisingly ambiguous on this issue. In a dissenting opinion in Lo Bue
v. United States,21s he issued a dictum supporting the validity of the
new Rule. His assertion that its only purpose had been to create a
presumption against finality absent express action by the district court
suggested that the bounds of appealability had not been enlarged.2 19
Yet the example he gave of a situation testing these bounds, a grant
of permission to amplify a, complaint, was so extreme as to intimate
that they had been expanded.2 2 °
Within the next two years, Clark resolved the issue in favor of a wide
scope of appealability under the new Rule. Presumably he thought
that reducing the burden of litigation on this procedural subject was
of prime importance.22' For both personal and policy reasons he prob-
ably also wished to undercut Judge Frank's proposal for a legislative
expansion of interlocutory appeals..2 22 At the same time, the require-
ment of a formal determination of finality by the district judge hope-
fully would ensure against excessive piecemeal appeals.223 To be sure,
Clark's view dictated a narrow reading of "claim," whereas in other
settings he preferred a broad construction. Apparently he had reverted
to his contention in Collins that the same word might be interpreted
differently in different contexts, depending on its function. 224
Meanwhile Judge Frank had written an opinion in Republic of
China v. American Express Co.,2 2 stating in dictum that the amend-
ment had not enlarged appealability. Clark expressed displeasure that
this had been done in a case in which he was not a member of the
panel, and he resolved to record his views at the next opportunity.22
The first case to present such an opportunity, Pabellon v. Grace Line,
Inc.,2 2 7 involved the dismissal of third and fourth-party indemnity
actions against the suppliers and makers of defective goods while the
217. Rule 82 provides that the Federal Rules "shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .
218. 178 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1949).
219. Id. at 531 n.1.
220. Id.
221. See p. 942 supra.
222. See memoranda in Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951)
(June 14 & 26, 1951); M. SCHICK, supra note 2, at 229-40.
223. See p. 942 supra.
224. See pp. 938-39 supra.
225. 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951).
226. Letter to Judge Frank (June 14, 1951).
227. 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
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original tort action brought by the person injured by the goods was
still pending. Clark conceded in his opinion for the court that the
orders were appealable under the old Rule, and Judge Frank agreed;2 2
indeed, none of the parties had questioned this. In a memorandum
to the other members of the panel, Clark acknowledged that the dis-
trict judge had misused his power to make the orders final, pre-
sumably because the requirement in the new Rule that there be "no
just reason for delay" had not been met.2 2 But he also asserted that
the time was right to clarify misconceptions about amended Rule
54(b).2 3 1 Accordingly, he stated in his opinion, on the authority of
Professor Moore, that "it is within the district judge's power to make
certain orders final that would not have been final under the original
rule.' 231 On this point, Frank disagreed vigorously. 232
As in the case of summary judgment,2-33 Clark was promptly re-
buffed by a panel on which he did not sit. In Flegenheimer v. Gen-
eral MVIills, Inc.,2 34 decided eight days after Pabellon, the senior mem-
bers of the court, Judges Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, and Swan,
declined to be bound by Pabellon because the views expressed were
clearly unnecessary to the decision. They read amended Rule 54(b)
as not expanding appealability, suggesting that if it had done so it
would be invalid 2 3 5 This narrow reading of the amended Rule
strengthened the argument that a new statute on interlocutory ap-
peals was still necessary, and one month later Frank submitted to the
Judicial Conference of the United States a revised legislative pro-
posal. His action was particularly galling to Clark because Frank
cited Professor Moore, Clark's former ally, as a proponent of the
legislation.23 0
Now that his mind was made up, Clark fought back, as in Arnstein
v. Porter, 2 37 with fierce determination. In Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-
Ur-Self Systems, Inc., 23 8 which arose out of an automobile accident,
the action against the car rental company was dismissed while those
against the company's customer and its local agerr._ were still pending.
228. Id. at 173; id. at 176 (Frank, J., concurring).
229. See Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. H. Muehistein & Co., 280 F.2d 775, 777-79 (2d Cir. 1960).
230. Memoranda in Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951) (June
14 & 26, 1951).
231. 191 F.2d at 173.
232. Id. at 176 (Frank, J., concurring).
233. See p. 930 supra, discussing Dochler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149
F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945).
234. 191 F.2d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1951).
235. Id.
236. Letter to Edmund Morgan (Apr. 6, 1953).
237. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See p. 930 supra.
238. 194 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1951).
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It is unclear whether, as Clark claimed, the dismissal would have
been appealable under the old Rule. In any event, Judges Augustus
Hand and Swan affirmed in a per curiam opinion that did not even
mention the Rule 54(b) problem. Clark's long concurring opinion,
by contrast, covered the whole subject and featured the strained argu-
ment that if a liberal interpretation of the new Rule 54(b) were
invalid, so were a score or more of other Federal Rules relating to
appellate practices. 23 9 He also criticized the panel in Flegenheimer
for its "flat repudiation" of "the confines of precedent," for having
given him "no notice of the impending doom" of Pabellon, and for
"describing opprobriously" his "hard work as only 'dictum.' "1240 Clark
admitted several years later that his language may have been offen-
sive, but he still thought it entirely justified.24 1
After this outburst, Clark let the issue pass by in silence in Colonial
Airlines, Inc. v. Janas,24 2 though he indicated in his memorandum
to the other members of the panel that the case might be used to
overturn Flegenheime.24 3 But he encouraged liberal interpretations
of Rule 54(b) in other courts, sending a copy of his opinion in
Lopinsky to the Third Circuit while it was considering the issue
en banc.2 4 He persuaded the Advisory Committee to propose a further
amendment to Rule 54(b) that would overturn Flegenheimer by ex-
pressly permitting appeal in all multiple-party cases.24  And he fought
Judge Frank's legislative proposal within the Judicial Conference. -2 4 ,
When these efforts were not wholly successful, Clark again sought
to establish his viewpoint within the Second Circuit. United Artists
Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, Inc., 47 a very liberal decision on
ancillary jurisdiction, also posed the issue of appealability in a fairly
extreme way. Actions against three business executives had been dis-
missed while the action against their company, with which they were
accused of conspiring, was still pending. Although the parties had not
raised the issue, and no one had mentioned it at the case conference,
Clark ventured to suggest in his draft opinion that dismissal of one
239. Id. at 424-30.
240. Id. at 429 & n.16.
241. Letter to Justice Frankfurter (Sept. 29, 1954).
242. 202 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1953).
243. Memorandum in Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Janas, 202 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1953)
(Jan. 15, 1953).
244. See letter from Harriet Humphre)s (Dec. 17, 1951).
245. See 1955 RE'ORT, supra note 62, at 54. This amendment was rejected by the
Supreme Court in 1955 but was finally adopted in 1961. 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE
17 54.01[6-1], at 54, 1 54.29[3], at 426-27 (2d ed. 1975).
246. Letter to the Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 11, 1951).
217. 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955). For a discussion of this case in the context of
ancillai) jurisdiction and compulsory counterclaims, see p. 934 supra.
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of several parties was always separately appealable. When Judge Hincks
showed doubt,248 Clark called on other members of the court to help
allay Hinck's concern 249 and the opinion came down substantially
as drafted. 250
Clark's final skirmish on this matter occurred a few months later
in Rieser v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.*2 1 The judgment below was
appealable under any view of Rule 54(b), as Clark himself acknowl-
edged. 252 But the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to resolve
the issue of appealability after dismissal of a party, and Clark was
determined to influence the Court.2 53 Accordingly, he wrote another
exhaustive opinion defending his liberal views on appealability.2-14 To
assure that his opinion was seen by the Supreme Court, he had copies
sent to lawyers involved in the case.255
There was a mixed outcome to the dispute on this issue. The Su-
preme Court interpreted the existing Rule substantially as Clark ad-
vocated .2 6 It temporarily shelved the amendment sought by Clark,
but in 1961, two years before his death, it finally adopted the present
Rule 54(b), which covers multiple parties. On the other hand, in
1958 Congress enacted a modified version of Judge Frank's proposal,
the present § 1292(b) of the Judicial Code,2 57 allowing certain inter-
locutory appeals. Clark did his best to narrow the statute by judicial
interpretation and criticized what remained of it."-' 1s
Even during the dispute over amended Rule 54(b), Clark had in-
dicated his continuing opposition to piecemeal review outside this
Rule. An important source of such review was the collateral order
doctrine, whereby procedural "offshoots" of litigation were appealable
separately. Clark repeatedly sought to subject the cases to amended
Rule 54(b), which ordinarily would have precluded review.2 5 9 Failing
248. Memorandum in United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiecc Prods., Inc., 221 F.2d 213
(2d Cir. 1955) (Mar. 14, 1955).
249. Letter to Judge Medina (Mar. 12, 1955).
250. 221 F.2d at 215-16.
251. 224 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1955).
252. Id. at 199-200.
253. Memorandum in Ricser v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 224 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1935) (Apr.
28, 1955).
254. 224 F.2d at 200-04.
255. Letter to Leland Tolman (June 8, 1955).
256. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
257. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
258. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Brown v.
Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring); Matthies v. Seymour
Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 740 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1959).
259. Harmar Drive-In Theater v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 239 F.2d 555, 557 (2d Cir.)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1956); Republic of Italy v. De Angelis,
206 F.2d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 1953) (Clark, J., concurring).
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to convince his court, he sought unsuccessfully to obtain from the
Advisory Committee an amendment to the same effect.200
Therefore, it is not surprising that when the battle over piecemeal
appeals had ended, Clark began to emphasize the limits of Rule 54(b).
He may have felt that a safety valve was no longer strategically neces-
sary since Frank was now dead and Congress had enacted the inter-
locutory appeals statute despite Clark's opposition. Moreover, he may
have thought that the issue no longer produced such an excessive
amount of litigation that a permissive reading of the Rule was of
prime value. In any event, in his final shift of position on Rule
54(b), lie reverted to his earlier policy against piecemeal review.
Two 1960 cases illustrate the shift. Luckenbach Steamship Co. v.
Muehlstein & Co. ,21 in which a third-party indemnity action against
the supplier of defective equipment was dismissed while the original
tort action by the injured person was still pending, resembled Pa-
bellon.20 2 The district judge had not yet made a determination of
finality under Rule 54(b). But Clark suggested very strongly, and at
considerable length, that if such a determination were granted it would
be an abuse of discretion.2 3 He had felt the same way in Pabellon
but at that time would not have considered saying so in print.2 4 Like-
wise, Ferguson v. Bartels Brewing Co.,2 5 in which actions against two
business executives had been dismissed while the action against their
alleged co-conspirator was still pending, echoed the prior case of United
Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, Inc.2 6 Again, the district
judge had not yet made a determination of finality. But Clark wrote
his colleagues that such a determination would still not have saved
the appeal.2017 The per curiam opinion denying a petition for re-
hearing suggested that only the proposed amendment to Rule 54(b)
providing for piecemeal review in multiple-party cases could do that.2 6s
Clark's judicial record in Rule 54(b) cases thus showed him at
his most reflective. He came to the bench with few views on the
subject and was forced to work them out as cases arose, changing his
mind several times. Having initially chosen a direction, he pursued
260. See Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules, 7 VAND. L. REv. 521, 533-54 (1954).
261. 280 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960).
262. See pp. 943-44 supra.
263. 280 F.2d at 757-59.
264. Memoranda in Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951) (June
14 & 26, 1951).
265. 284 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1960).
266. 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955). See pp. 945-46 supra.
267. Memorandum in Ferguson v. Bartels Brewing Co., 284 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Nov. 4, 1960).
268. 284 F.2d at 857.
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it as zealously as those he had settled on prior to his appointment.
When changed conditions and strategic necessity obliged him to seek
a different course, he found one and again defended it resolutely.
Finally, when the controversy had ended, he felt free to revert to
his prior views.
F. Scope of the Rules
A final group of Judge Clark's decisions concerned the scope of
the Federal Rules. In accord with his prior views, he was inclined
to apply the Rules as widely as possible. From the time they were
adopted, Clark campaigned as a rulemaker to extend the Rules to
admiralty cases. G09 This reform was finally enacted in 1966, -7- three
years after his death. Meanwhile, having warned that the judges might
force the Federal Rules upon the admiralty bar if the rulemakers
failed,2 71 Clark also pursued this goal in his opinions. A striking ex-
ample is James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. v. Connors Marine Co.,2 7 2 in
which the respondent argued that the libel should have stated sep-
arately the allegations concerning each of 21 bargeloads of grain be-
cause the barges had been chartered by separate agreements. Clark
acknowledged that admiralty rules still required a separate statement
of each cause of action, but he disparaged this requirement by com-
paring it to the modern policy in Rule 10(b), which calls for separate
statements only when they facilitate presentation of the case. Clark
contended that the admiralty rules should also be construed practically
and that a separate statement serving no constructive purpose in this
case was unnecessary.2
73
Clark also worked diligently for the merger of civil and admiralty
actions, paralleling the merger of law and equity he had already ac-
complished. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana7 4 illustrates his
approach. The survivors of a victim of an airplane crash, having sued
in admiralty for damages, brought another nearly identical suit at
law to preserve their right to a jury trial. On appeal from a dismissal
269. Letter to Edmund Morgan (Apr. 6, 1953); Clark, The Proper Functioning of the
Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee, 28 A.B.A.J. 521, 525 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as Clark, Proper Functioning].
270. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACricE f 1.01(4], at 112 (2d ed. 1975).
271. Letter to Roscoe Hupper (Dec. 17, 1941); Clark, Proper Functioning. supra note
269, at 525.
272. 141 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1944). Other examples are Star Brick Corp. v. Johnson,
262 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1959); Stathatos v. Arnold Bernstein S.S. Corp., 202 F.2d 525 (2d
Cir. 1953).
273. 141 F.2d at 228.
274. 318 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1963). Other examples are
McAfoos v. Canadian Pacific Steamships, Ltd., 243 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 833 (1959); Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954).
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of the latter action, the parties focused on whether foreign law pre-
cluded a trial by jury.27  Clark, however, preferred to discuss the re-
lationship between civil and admiralty suits, and he persuaded his re-
luctant colleagues on the panel to go along.2 7 6 His opinion held that
the civil action was properly dismissed because the original admiralty
suit could embrace jury as well as nonjury claims. 27 7 This was an
important step toward merging the two systems. Not surprisingly, the
plaintiffs complained in their petition for rehearing that the appeal
had been decided on a ground never argued, nor even considered, by
the parties.27 8
Occasionally, Clark conceded that admiralty practice differed from
the Federal Rules,279 though in the most striking case his reasons were
primarily tactical. Mercado v. United States,2 -s a personal injury ac-
tion in admiralty by a seaman working for the federal government,
concerned the admission at trial of a deposition submitted by the
seaman. At first, Clark was determined to uphold admissibility, 2s1 for
that would have been the result under the Federal Rules, and, besides,
a contrary decision meant depriving the injured seaman of his judg-
ment. But in the end he not only decided that the deposition was
inadmissible; 2,12 he also held that several of the provisions of the
Rules did not apply in admiralty and that transfer from admiralty
to the civil side, where the Federal Rules would apply, was not per-
missible in seamen's injury suits against the federal government. -8 3
The explanation for Clark's unusual behavior appears toward the
end of the opinion:
We are the more constrained to this regrettable conclusion be-
cause a doubtful extension of the civil rules in admiralty may
cause more confusion than a clean-cut decision demonstrating the
need of revision. To our minds this case shows the desirability
of making the civil rules directly applicable in admiralty .... 284
275. 318 F.2d at 711.
276. Memorandum in Noel v. Linea Acropostal Venezolana, 318 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.
1963) (May 2, 1963).
277. 318 F.2d at 711.
278. Memorandum discussing Petition for Rehearing in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 318 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1963) (July 11, 1963).
279. E.g., Lo Bue v. United States, 178 F.2d 528, 531 (2d Cir. 1949) (Clark, J., dis-
senting); Petrol Corp. v. PetroIetm Heat & Power Co., 162 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1947).
280 184 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1930).
281. ,Memorandum in Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1950) (June 9,
1930).
282. 184 F.2d at 29.
283. Id. at 27-29. He stated that Rule 45(e)(1), providing for the subpoena of wit-
nesses within 100 miles of the place of trial, and Rule 26(d)(3), allowing the use of
depositions at trial when subpoenas were unavailable, were not applicable in admiralty.
284. Id. at 29.
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This all-or-nothing position embodied the strategy Clark had ad-
vocated 10 years earlier in an article entitled Dissatisfaction with Piece-
meal Reform.2 83 Its rigidity was tempered by Clark's expectation that
the deposition would be admissible upon retrial because of an inter-
vening change in the rules of the Southern District of New York.2- 6
The other major issue of scope arose in diversity cases, where Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins2s might require displacement of the Federal
Rules by state law. Here again, Clark followed through on ideas de-
veloped earlier in his career. His first reaction to Erie was to warn
against assuming ouster of the Rules.2- 8 This warning soon ripened
into a firm conviction, asserted in numerous articles and speeches, that
the Federal Rules should apply except in unusual circumstances.-""
Indeed, throughout the rest of his life he campaigned unceasingly for
adoption of the Federal Rules in state court proceedings. 00
Clark rarely had occasion to express these views from the bench.
The most important of the cases, Arrowsmith v. United Press Inter-
national,201 was not decided until the last year of his life. The Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled a Clark precedent only three years
old 292 and held that personal jurisdiction in an ordinary federal di-
versity suit could be based only on the law of the forum state .29 3
Clark, in angry dissent, persevered in his position that federal law
might provide alternative grounds of jurisdiction..2 0 4 The Federal
Rules were directly involved only to the extent that Rule 4(f) on the
territorial limits of effective service might provide one of the alter-
native federal standards. But, as he often did, Clark heightened the
controversy by arguing that the majority position foreshadowed the
subjection of numerous other Federal Rules to the principle of Erie,
a result he deplored.295
285. Clark, Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform, 24 Jun. 121 (1940) [hereinafter
cited as Clark, Dissatisfaction].
286. Memorandum in Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1950) (Junc
10, 1950).
287. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
288. Pp. 920-21 supra.
289. E.g., Clark, Procedural Aspects of the New State Independence, 8 GEO. W,%su.
L. REV. 1230 (1940); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omni-
presence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 288-89 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Clark,
State Law].
290. Clark, Proper Functioning, supra note 269, at 525; Clark, Dissatisfaction, supra
note 285, at 122. See Wright & Reasoner, Introduction in PROCEDURE: THE HANDMAIn
OF JUSTICE 3 (C. WRIGHT & H. REASONER eds. 1965).
291. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
292. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
293. 320 F.2d at 230.
294. Id. at 239-41.
295. Id. at 242. See Riggs, Ferris & Geer v. Lillibridgc, 316 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1963).
For Clark's developing views on the application of Rule 60(b) in bankruptcy pro-
Vol. 85: 914, 1976
Judge Clark and the Federal Rules
III. Conclusions
In accord with our initial speculations about judicial behavior,
Judge Clark's votes in cases involving the Federal Rules were largely
predictable. He came to the bench with resolute views on most matters
covered by the Rules, and his work as a judge consisted of imple-
menting them. He defended the validity of the Rules against chal-
lenges under the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act,2-° ° he
brushed aside precedents that he thought construed the Rules in-
correctly, and he even sought through his decisions to correct what
he regarded as errors in the Rules themselves.
Clark's manner of expressing his views also befitted a judge who
had explored the subject thoroughly and was determined to see his
conclusions prevail. His opinions often dealt exhaustively with the
procedural problems. He frequently spotted issues not evident to
others, ruled on points that need not have been reached or were not
in dispute, and espoused revisions in the law. When writing for the
majority, he sought to curtail dissent; when in the minority, he in-
sisted on having his own say. His efforts did not end with cases on
which he sat. He would circulate memoranda on issues before they
arose, urge en banc hearings when other panels contradicted his views,
and privately rebuke the authors of errant opinions.
Clark's descriptions of himself reflected this tenacity. After a sharp
exchange with Judge Learned Hand in 1944, he confessed: "I sup-
pose we procedure guys get too excited when our babies appear
maimed." 297 In a memorandum to the entire court in 1951, he ex-
plained his refusal to abide by certain precedents: "Since I am so
publicly committed to advocacy of procedural rules both simple and
uniform, it is distressing to me, as well as confusing to others who
read, to have to announce and follow procedural views I oppose
.. ,"28 And in a 1953 case memorandum, he asserted that Judge
Frank "does not feel the compulsion which I as a Reporter to the
ceedings, see Delaware & Hudson Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 227 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 987 (1955); Grand Union Equip. Co. v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 958
(2d Cir. 1948); Perlman v. 322 West 72d St. Co., 127 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1942); Kroell
v. New York Ambassador, Inc., 108 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1939). For his views on the appli-
cation of the Rules in cases in which the Government was a party, compare Bowles
v. Bay of New York Coal & Supply Corp., 152 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1945), with Sherwood
v. United States, 112 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 584 (1941). For Clark's
overall assessment of the way in which the Rules were being effectuated, see Clark,
Special Problems in Drafting and Implementing Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND.
L. REv. 493 (1950).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
297. M. ScHIcK, supra note 2, at 224 n.8 (quoting letter to Judge Learned Hand-
(Feb. 2, 1944)).
298. Id. at 105 (quoting memorandum to Second Circuit judges (Jan. 23, 1951)).
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Committee and as a teacher in the field do to make the rules work-
able." 299
On the other hand, Clark's propensity to pursue his prior views in
Federal Rules cases arose in part from causes peculiar to himself. Some
of his votes may have been influenced by his nonprocedural sympathies.
I have particularly in mind the pleading decisions in which he fos-
tered civil liberties and antitrust enforcement and the skepticism of
copyright claims that he showed in summary judgment cases like
Arnstein v. Porter.300 Indeed, many of Clark's views on procedural
issues themselves may have been influenced by his current political
values as well as by prior scholarly commitments. Although not a
declared New Dealer, Clark was at least a sympathizer of the cause.
He was inclined to oppose big business301 and to see the federal gov-
ernment as the primary instrument of the public good.3 i2 On the
former ground, he might have tended to support procedural reforms,
including simplified pleading and liberal joinder, which made liti-
gation for both parties less expensive and less tricky. He also might
have endorsed practices particularly favoring plaintiffs, such as leni-
ency toward pleadings and liberal discovery. Moreover, his skepticism
of states' rights might have disposed him against limiting federal
jurisdiction or the application of federal procedural law.3 3
Even more clearly, Clark's conduct was influenced by his distinc-
tive temperament. Descriptions by his associates consistently portray
a person of decided views who never tired of seeking to effectuate
them. Professor Fleming James noted that for a cause "he was not
only always ready to do battle, but he was also dogged and per-
servering in his pursuit of it, far beyond the capacity or taste of
most men."'30 4 Similarly, Judge Harold Medina observed:
There may have been a touch of the spirit of compromise in his
make-up, but I never noticed it.
. . [W]hen he got determined about something he was
going to keep harping on it and harping on it, and picking
away and picking away until it was accomplished or the time
to do anything was gone.303
299. Id. at 225 (quoting memorandum in Malman v. United States, 202 F.2d 483 (2d
Cir. 1953) (Feb. 4, 1953)).
300. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
301. See M. ScHICK, supra note 2, at 248-49.
302. See id. at 251; Clark, State Law, supra note 289, at 296.
303. See M. SCHICK, supra note 2, at 251.
304. Charles E. Clark, 73 YALE L.J., Jan. 1964, at ix, x (faculty resolution authored
by Professor Fleming James, Jr.).
305. Address by Judge Medina, Proceedings in Memoriamn, Honorable Charles E. Clank,
328 F.2d 9, 12 (1964).
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And his good friend, Professor Fred Rodell, stated that "in a tough
fight against long odds and rough opposition, it would be Charlie
Clark I would rather have on my side."306
Furthermore, Clark's record in Federal Rules cases did not consist
simply of carrying out his prior views. First, there were certain points
covered by the Rules, such as class actions and piecemeal appeals, to
which Clark had contributed little as a draftsman and on which he
came to the court without developed opinions. On these issues, Clark
had to work out his stance as cases arose. He acknowledged as much
in a lecture on the newly-adopted Rules shortly before he became
a judge: "[T]here is one difficulty of my trying to stand up here
and pass rather snap judgment on questions that certainly are going
to be thoroughly litigated. '3 ° 7 Some of the issues he resolved quickly,
but others took him years to sort out, even with the help of his col-
league Professor Moore, and in the meantime he often changed his
mind. The prime example, of course, was his experience with Rule
54(b).
Second, his own preferences sometimes conflicted with the Rules.
Occasionally, as in the case of Rule 14 on third-party practice, he
felt that the Rules went too far toward reform; more typically, he
believed that they did not go far enough. His tendency in these
cases was to adhere to his own views rather than to the Rules. In-
deed, shortly after being appointed judge, he joked to a former col-
league on the Advisory Committee: "In fact, I suppose I can try to
correct some of the mistakes which I think the Committee may have
made, if that is according to the rules of the game, and isn't it?"30
Yet, at times Clark subordinated his own preferences to superior
authority-the language or legislative history of a Rule or an inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court. The most striking example is Vibra
Bruish Corp. v. Scha ffer, 3 9 in which he suppressed his opposition to
strict substitution requirements.
Third, even when Clark's personal views coincided with the Rules,
he had choices to make. A man of affairs, he was sensitive to stra-
tegic political considerations, and sometimes these overcame his pro-
cedural preferences. He declined to write at length on subjects dear
to him or even kept silent altogether, for fear of creating trouble.
He went so far as to speak somewhat against his own views, as in
306. Rodell, For Charles E. Clark: A Brief and Belated, But Fond Farewell, 65 COLUNI.
L. REV. 1323, 1328 (1965).
307. 1938 CLEVELAND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 254.
308. Letter to George Donworth, Oct. 26, 1939.
309. 256 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1958). See p. 937 supra.
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his stern disparagement of "notice pleading,"310 to avert worse dan-
gers. He even cast votes inconsistent with his personal preferences.
One notable instance was his occasional refusal to apply the Rules
piecemeal in admiralty cases in order to highlight the need for
wholesale reform.311
There was an even more extraneous influence which perplexed
Clark in cases involving the Federal Rules. Although he heartily en-
dorsed Judge Frank's appointment to the Second Circuit, he gradually
came, I believe, to dislike Frank. It is natural to cite their many
disagreements on procedural issues-especially summary judgments and
interlocutory appeals-as a cause of the tension between them.112 But
I would suggest that the reverse may also have been true-that ani-
mosity affected Clark's views on those issues. I find it difficult to ex-
plain the extreme vehemence with which he endorsed expanded ap-
pealability under amended Rule 54(b), for example, without allowing
for his personal desire to thwart Frank.
Most revealing of all, there were subjects on which Clark felt
obliged to rethink his own well-developed views as new procedural
considerations appeared. This might have been expected on questions
of means, such as how merger might best be served in cases with both
legal and equitable claims. Yet Clark was sometimes forced to reassess
his ends, faced by newly perceived conflicts among basic values. The
most notable example was his decision to relent on piecemeal appeals,
in part in order to hold down the cost of litigating the issue.31 3 In
such cases Clark had to make difficult choices, and there would have
been no sure way of predicting in advance what his choices might be.
Professor Lon Fuller once wisely wrote:
[T]he judicial office can bring to expression both capacities for
problem-solving and individual differences in fundamental values.
One may, indeed, distinguish in the judicial process two aspects,
the one consisting of what may be called signpost-setting, the
other of constructing roadways to the destinations indicated by
the signs. Just as there are legislators who are magnificent on the
floor and weak in committee, so there are judges who are very
adept in setting signposts but less effective in road construction.
One sometimes has the uncomfortable feeling that these are the
favorites of the predictors [of judicial behavior]. Certainly such
judges offer more tractable material for their researches. 14
310. P. 925 supra.
311. Pp. 949-50 supra.
312. See M. ScHicK, supra note 2, at 245.
313. See p. 943 supra.
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Clark was indeed "magnificent on the floor," a tenacious battler
for causes in which he believed. His conduct as a judge in cases in-
volving the Federal Rules was correspondingly predictable. But his
work as Reporter showed that he was also strong "in committee. '' 315
He did not lose this capacity when he became a judge. He remained
intelligent enough by far to recognize hard problems and sufficiently
scrupulous to seek to solve rather than evade them. For this reason
his judicial behavior can never be reduced to a simple formula.
315. See M. SCrCK, supra note 2, at 31 (quoting remarks of Henry Chandler).
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